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COMMENTS
Stigma Damages: The Case for Recovery in
Condominium Construction Defect Litigation
For wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an in-
jury, it also gives a remedy by action; and therefore, wherever a
new injury is done, a new method of remedy must be pursued.1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, California has experienced explosive
growth in condominium construction. "[T]oday the typical home-
owner in California owns a real property interest in a planned de-
velopment, condominium, cooperative, or other similar interest,
rather than the detached single family home of the post-World
War II years."2 As opposed to owning single family dwellings, a
condominium owner owns3 only the airspace within his unit,4 or
1. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
2. Raven's Cove Townhomes v. Knuppe Dev., 115 Cal. App. 3d 783, 794, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 334, 340 (1981). The court notes Department of Real Estate estimates that as of
1978 there were 10,000 homeowner associations in California and they were being created
at a rate of 160 per month, producing a projection of at least 19,000 more in the next
decade. Between 1973 and 1981, condominium ownership more than tripled, indicating
that the preferred form of housing may be changing. The American Dream is Changing,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 12, at 1. Condominium sales accounted for 14.9% of all
home sales in 1986, compared to 10.1 % in 1984. CAL REAL EST., July-Aug. 1987, at 6.
Although the condominium market is currently "soft" in California (condominium sales
dropped to 13% of all home sales in 1987, L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 1988, part VIII, at 8) the
general market outlook for condos is good. What You Should Know About Condo Sales,
CAL. REAL EST., June 1986, at 32. Citing lawsuits, higher costs, and the slow-growth move-
ment, California home builders are apprehensive about the home construction market in
1989, but 1988 will nonetheless be a good year. Caution Flag Up After Robust Years, L.A.
Times, Mar. 27, 1988, part VIII, at 1.
3. Condominiums are not always held in fee. "A condominium may, with respect to
the duration of its enjoyment, be either (1) an estate of inheritance or perpetual estate, (2)
an estate for life, (3) an estate for years, such as a leasehold or a subleasehold, or (4) any
combination of the foregoing." CAL. CIv. CODE § 783 (West Supp. 1988).
4. What constitutes a condominium is codified in Title 6 of the CIVIL CODE:
A condominium consists of an undivided interest in common in a portion of real
property coupled with a separate interest in space called a unit, the boundaries of
which are described on a recorded final map, or condominium plan sufficient in
detail to locate all boundaries thereof. The area within these boundaries may be
filled with air, earth, or water, or any combination thereof, and need not be physi-
cally attached to land except by easements for access and, if necessary, support.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
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"separate interests."15 These separate interests are surrounded by
the common areas:6 the structure, roofing, hallways, plumbing,
landscaping, and other areas in common use. The common areas
are owned by the condominium homeowners as tenants in com-
mon7 and managed by the homeowners association, which is re-
sponsible for their maintenance.8
The growth of condominium construction has been accompa-
nied by a similar increase in construction defect litigation.9
Problems with soil compaction, defective materials, or negligent
construction supervision may result in physical damage to com-
mon area structures, leaky roofs or pipes, or dead foliage. Courts
in the past have awarded damages for the cost of repairing com-
mon areas such as structural shoring, roof and plumbing repairs,
and renewed landscaping.10 However, for the individual unit own-
The description of the unit may refer to (i) boundaries described in the recorded
final map, parcel map, or condominium plan, (ii) physical boundaries, either in
existence, or to be constructed, such as walls, floors, and ceilings of a structure or
any portion thereof, (iii) an entire structure containing one or more units, or (iv)
any combination thereof. The portion or portions of the real property held in undi-
vided interest may be all of the real property, except for the separate interests, or
may include a particular three-dimensional portion thereof, the boundaries of
which are described on a recorded final map, parcel map, or condominium plan.
The area within these boundaries may be filled with air, earth, or water, or any
combination thereof, and need not be physically attached to land except by ease-
ments for access and, if necessary, support. An individual condominium within a
condominium project may include, in addition, a separate interest in other portions
of the real property.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1351(f) (West Supp. 1988).
5. A "separate interest" in a condominium project refers to an individual unit. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1351(l)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
Unless the declaration or condominium plan, if any exists, otherwise provides, if
walls, floors, or ceilings are designated as boundaries of a separate interest, the
interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, doors, and outlets
located within the separate interest are part of the separate interest and any other
portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are part of the common areas.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(l) (West Supp. 1988).
6. "Common area" means everything but the separate interests. CAL CIv. CODE §
1351(b) (West Supp. 1988).
7. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1362 (West Supp. 1988). E.g. in a 200-unit complex, each
homeowner owns 1/200th of the common area.
8. CAL Civ. CODE § 1364 (West Supp. 1988).
9. Holm, Special Problems Related to Condominium Construction Litigation, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405 (1985); Natelson, Mending the Social Compact: Expectancy
Damages for Common Property Defects in Condominiums and Other Planned Communi-
ties, 66 ORE. L. REv. 109 (1987). This proliferation of litigation has helped cause the cost
of homeowner associations' liability insurance to increase by as much as 400%. CAL REAL
EST., Jan. 1986, at 12. The author has located 39 residential construction defect cases
which have reached the trial stage from January 1, 1985 through August 19, 1988. Eigh-
teen of these cases involved condominiums or townhouses. Of the 39 cases, 24 resulted in
plaintiff verdicts and 4 were reported settled. See 29 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, no. 1-31,
no. 44. These figures represent a small fraction of the total number of suits filed, as many
settlements go unreported.
10. Other items of recoverable damages in appropriate cases include loss of use, costs
2
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STIGMA DAMAGES
ers, this recovery may be far short of "the amount which will
compensate [them] for all the detriment proximately caused"" by
the defective construction. Injuries suffered by unit owners may
include an economic loss in value of their unit in addition to the
tangible physical damage to the common areas.
As the case of Easton v. Strassburger"2 makes clear, the seller
of real property and the real estate agent have an affirmative duty
to disclose to prospective buyers all facts affecting the value of the
property." This disclosure requirement has recently been codified
in California.14 This statute requires a seller of real property to
deliver to all prospective buyers a written statement detailing any
structural additions, alterations, repairs, or replacements of signif-
icant components of the structure. Although a successful legal ac-
tion (usually initiated by the homeowners association) will recover
the cost to repair all common area construction defects, the indi-
vidual unit owners must nonetheless disclose to all prospective
buyers the fact that poor construction required repair.
Disclosure of prior damage to the common areas may result in a
lower resale price of the unit, depending upon the type of physical
injury suffered by the common areas. If the construction defect is
leaky roofs or pipes, peeling wallpaper, or another patent defect,15
repair should restore the condominiums to the market value of
comparable units in an undamaged complex. However, if the de-
fect is soil subsidence, site drainage, structural, or another latent
defect, 6 repair may not restore the condominiums to their undam-
of expert investigations, and attorney's fees.
11. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 provides: "For the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this
code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not."
12. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
13. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
14.
As soon as practicable before transfer of title for the first sale of a unit in a resi-
dential condominium, community apartment project, or stock cooperative which
was converted from an existing dwelling to a condominium project, community
apartment project, or stock cooperative, the owner or subdivider, or agent of the
owner or subdivider, shall deliver to a prospective buyer a written statement listing
all substantial defects or malfunctions in the major systems in the unit and com-
mon areas of the premises, or a written statement disclaiming knowledge of any
such substantial defects or malfunctions. The disclaimer may be delivered only
after the owner or subdivider has inspected the unit and the common areas and
has not discovered a substantial defect or malfunction which a reasonable inspec-
tion would have disclosed.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1134 (West Supp. 1988). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.14.
15. A "patent defect" is one that is plainly visible or which can be discovered by
such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of ordinary care. See BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1013 (5th ed. 1979). See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1988).
16. A "latent defect" is one that is hidden or concealed. "One which could not be
1989]
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aged value. Prospective buyers, whose judgment determines mar-
ket value,17 may fear the problem will recur despite assurances to
the contrary. Because the cause of the physical damage may be
hidden,18 buyers cannot evaluate the situation for themselves. Be-
ing unable to understand the defect, the nature of its repair, and
the chances of recurrence, the market will demand a lower price.
A condominium selling for a lower price because of prior de-
fects in the common areas can be analogized to a new car depreci-
ating when driven off the showroom floor. Even though a car with
twenty miles on the odometer and a condominium with structural
repair are both "as good as new," there may be a psychological
"stigma" or "taint" on the property causing it to have a lower
market value. Throughout this Comment the term "stigma" refers
to the residual loss in market value suffered by previously dam-
aged property despite repair. On the other hand, "diminution in
value" refers to the total loss in market value of damaged prop-
erty, or the loss in value prior to repair. However psychologically
curious the stigma on a condominium owner's airspace may be,
the result is a very real loss;19 a loss which can be quantified by a
real estate appraiser.
Although the law in California regarding recoverable damages
for construction defects is unclear, court decisions suggest that
stigma damages for injury to real property are not recoverable.20
discovered by reasonable and customary inspection; one not apparent on face of goods,
product, document, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794, 795 (5th ed. 1979). See CAL
CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West Supp. 1988).
17. "Value is extrinsic to the commodity, good, or service to which it is ascribed; it is
created in the minds of people who constitute a market." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL
ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 31 (7th ed. 1983). "Market value"
is defined as "[tlhe most probable price in cash, terms equivalent to cash, or in other
precisely revealed terms, for which the appraised property will sell in a competitive market
under all conditions requisite to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently,
knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue duress"
(AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra, at 33) or "[t/he price in cash
and/or other identified terms for which the specified real property interest is expected to
sell in the real estate marketplace under all conditions requisite to a fair sale." Korpacz,
Market Value: Contemporary Applications, APPRAISAL J., Jul. 1985, at 439. See also Sac-
ramento R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979 (1909).
18. The latent/patent distinction is only illustrative. The two types of defects are
defined in the Civil Code for statute of limitations purposes. The defects discussed
herein-improper soil compaction or subsidence, i.e. structural or foundational defects--
need not be (but typically are) latent. The affect these serious defects have upon market
value is not diminished by their being apparent or easily discoverable. The distinguishing
characteristic is their affect upon market value, due perhaps to the layperson's inability to
appreciate the physical nature of the problem and the engineering principles behind the
repair.
19. An example helps illustrate the magnitude of this damage. A 200-unit complex
whose undamaged units sell for $100,000 may command 10% or $10,000 less upon disclos-
ure of defective construction (despite repair). This results in a $2,000,000 total loss.
20. See infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
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This Comment presents analyses by which a court can allow
stigma damages and remain consistent with prior decisions which
hold that the law of damages is flexible, and uphold the recovery
of stigma damages for injured automobiles,"' and other goods.22
Decisions from other jurisdictions that allow stigma damages for
construction defects" and other types of property damage;2 4 and
trends in California trial courts25 all make a strong case for recov-
ery of stigma in California for general construction defect cases.
However, the stigma on individual condominiums caused by de-
fective construction of the common areas is unique and requires a
separate analysis.
Stigma suffered by a detached home is derived from physical
defects in the home itself. The same is true of a damaged automo-
bile-the property suffering the stigma is the damaged property.
However, an individual condominium derives its stigma from
property outside the unit-i.e. the defective common areas. This
fact is made necessary by the condominium ownership scheme
wherein the unit owner owns essentially airspace. The airspace
can suffer no physical damage itself, and defective interior sur-
faces (wallpaper, floor coverings, and the like) will not cause
stigma because these deficiencies can be readily understood and
fixed by a homebuyer without fear of recurrence. Because the unit
owner must seek recovery for stigma which derives from previ-
ously damaged common areas, and not from physical damage to
their own property,26 the legal analysis for recovery of stigma in
condominium construction defect cases is distinct.2 7
21. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 59 & 68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
26. This is the case even though the unit owner has a fractional tenancy-in-common
interest in the common areas.
27. Another problem is standing to sue. Condominium construction defect actions
are most economically brought by the homeowner's association. The association clearly has
standing to sue for damage to the common areas, but recovery for damage to the individual
interests depends on the jurisdiction. In some states the individual owners must initiate a
class action suit, and in others the association may only sue in a representative capacity for
damage to the separate interests. In California, associations have been given statutory
standing to sue, as the real party in interest, for damages to individual interests which
"arise out of, or [are] integrally related to, damage to the common area." CAL CIV. PRoc.
CODE § 374(d). Although this statute has been called "a model of clarity whose interpreta-
tion cannot be left to conjecture," Holm, supra note 9, at 427; it is not altogether clear
whether an association has standing to sue for individual stigma damages. Certainly stigma
is damage which "arises out of" damage to the common areas, as long as "damage" does
not mean merely physical damage. California construction defect cases discussing the
standing issue include: Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 570 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal.), affid,
709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Del
Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n, 123 Cal. App. 3d 916, 176 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1981); Del
19891
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Apart from the legal issues, a prerequisite to recover stigma
damages is proof of their existence. A real estate appraisal and
the testimony of a real estate appraiser will supply the evidence
necessary to recover stigma damages. Therefore, the basic princi-
ples of real estate appraisal in the condominium context and the
methods by which real estate appraisers evaluate and quantify
stigma will be discussed first. Second, guideline cases from other
states allowing recovery of stigma for construction defects will be
discussed. Third, the legal theories which might be used in Cali-
fornia to recover this damage will be evaluated (1) for construc-
tion defects in general, and (2) for the special case of condomini-
ums. Recovering stigma damages under causes of action sounding
in tort (negligence, negligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage, and strict products liability) will be discussed,
with the goal of clarifying existing law.28 Finally, while urging an
expansion in the law to provide compensation for stigma caused
by defective construction, emphasis will be placed on the need to
maintain reasonable limits on recoverable damages for injury to
real property.
It is proposed that the proper measure of damages for construc-
tion defects is the cost to repair plus stigma remaining after re-
pair, or the total loss in value prior to repair; whichever is less.
This remedy should be afforded to all homeowners, including own-
ers of condominiums.
I. THE APPRAISER'S ROLE
A general understanding of the appraisal process is a prerequi-
site to understand the methods of quantifying stigma loss in con-
dominiums. An appraisal is an unbiased estimate of the value of
Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176
Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981); Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev., 114 Cal. App. 3d
783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981); Salton City Area Property Owners Ass'n v. M. Penn
Phillips Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d 184, 141 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1977); Residents of Beverly Glen,
Inc, v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1973); Greater
Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. App. 3d 523, 91 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1970); Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384
P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963); and Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshore-
men's & Warehousemen's Union, 119 Cal. App. 2d 144, 259 P.2d 23 (1953). Discussion of
this complex issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
28. Associations seeking to recover for construction defects may also utilize causes of
action for breach of implied/express warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, deceit, nui-
sance, inverse condemnation, and destruction of subjacent/lateral support. See
Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982) (fraud); Nelson v. Gaunt,
125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1981) (fraud); Younan v. Equifax, Inc., 111
Cal. App. 3d 498, 169 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1980) (breach of fiduciary duty); and Delos v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979) (fraud). However,
discussion of these causes of action is beyond the scope of this Comment.
[Vol. 25
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property based on pertinent data, application of appropriate ana-
lytical techniques to the data, and the knowledge, experience, and
professional judgment of the appraiser .2  An appraisal requires
consideration of all market value influences."0 Therefore, to ap-
praise the market value of a particular piece of real property, the
appraiser must take into account not only all the qualities of the
property itself, but also the social, economic, governmental, and
environmental circumstances affecting the property. 31
In appraising the present value of a condominium unit, an ap-
praiser must consider the quality of the neighborhood in which the
complex is located,32 the quality of the "subneighborhood" (the
complex) in which the unit is located,33 the amenity facilities in
the complex,34 and any unique quality of the unit.35 The conscien-
tious appraiser will perform a considerable amount of footwork by
talking to neighbors and owners, viewing the area, and generally
"getting to know" the property.
Once the pertinent data has been gathered, the appraiser esti-
mates the market value of the subject property by comparison to
similar properties.3 6 The value of the property is indicated by the
sale price of comparable property, plus or minus an adjustment
for features present in one property but not the other.37 Important
adjustments include those for off-site as well as on-site features,
29. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra note 17, at 11.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 29.
32. These qualities include the price-value range of single-family housing alternatives
in the area, financing conditions, owner versus tenant occupancy ratio, trends in condomin-
ium construction and conversion, number of units available, and the projected sales absorp-
tion rate. R. DOMBAL, RESIDENTIAL CONDOMINIUMS: A GUIDE TO ANALYSIS AND AP-
PRAISAL 69 (1976).
33. These qualities include the price-value range of units within the complex; charac-
teristics of other unit owners, including age, occupation and income; owner versus tenant
occupancy ratio, and resale price trends. Id.
34. Amenity facilities include recreation rooms, pools, laundry facilities, garages, and
golf courses. Id.
35. Important are the legal description of the air-lot and the net saleable area, the
utility of the unit and its physical condition, the presence of built-in's and extras, and the
existence of balconies or patios. Id.
36. This method of appraisal is called the "direct market comparison approach," and
is the most appropriate method of appraising residential real estate. A second method is the
"cost approach" wherein the property's value equals the cost of the improvements (struc-
tures) minus the depreciation of the improvements, plus the value of the situs. This method
is generally inappropriate for condominiums as they are built as a whole and sold by unit,
therefore having no per unit cost basis. A third method is called the "income approach."
Market value is based on the income, or return on investment, that a buyer expects from
the property. Property value equals the net operating income of the property divided by the
rate of return. This third method is most appropriate for income-producing property and is
generally inappropriate for residential property. See W. VENTOLO, FUNDAMENTALS OF
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL (4th ed. 1987); and R. DOMBAL, supra note 32, at 70.
37. W. VENTOLO, supra note 36, at 9.
1989]
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the conditions of sale, and the time from the date of the sale. 8
Before selecting a final appraised value, the appraiser performs
this computation on a number of similar properties recently sold.3
In condominium appraisal it is desirable to compare the subject
property to other units within the same complex.40 After gathering
information about the unit and comparing it to similar properties,
the appraiser arrives at an appraised market value. Before outlin-
ing how appraisal is used to quantify stigma, it is helpful to un-
derstand why and in what situations stigma arises.
The term "stigma" is used by real estate appraisers in the same
sense as it is used here-to denote the residual loss in market
value experienced by damaged property after repairs have been
accomplished.4' The residential property market is more irrational
than some other markets. "Prospective home buyers often look
more for 'magic' than for value and may shun property with ad-
mitted defects .... "42 After all, market value is "created in the
minds of people who constitute a market. ' 43 The subjective nature
of market value explains why stigma arises when the defect was in
subsurface or structural components, but not when the defect was,
for example, roofing or plumbing. Despite repair, prospective buy-
ers more rationally fear recurrence of problems from the former
group than from the latter. The nature of leaky roofs and their
repair are more easily appreciated by a layperson than the integ-
rity of structural repair or soil compaction.44
Appraisal literature talks of stigma as arising often in the case
of landslide-damaged property.45 Stigma is also discussed as it
arises from other forms of land failure, including soil creep, subsi-
dence, mudflows, erosion, and expansion.46 Thus, stigma may arise
from property damage caused naturally or damage precipitated by
defective construction. There is no reason to distinguish the threat
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. R. DOMBAL, supra note 32, at 71.
41. The word "stigma" appears in Levy, Casualty Loss Appraisals of Landslide
Damaged Real Estate, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER AND ANALYST, Fall 1984, at 10
[hereinafter Levy, Casualty Loss]; and, Levy, Landslides: Implications on the Appraisal
Process, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER AND ANALYST, Spring 1986, at 6 [hereinafter Levy,
Landslides].
42. Natelson, supra note 9, at 123.
43. See supra note 17.
44. A knowledgeable buyer, such as an engineer, may perceive no fear of recurrence.
Because the market value of the property is nonetheless depressed due to stigma, the
knowledgeable buyer may find the purchase of repaired subsidence-damaged property a
profitable long-term investment. His gain may be realized in subsequent years when the
engineering has proved effective, in the mind of the market, as indicated by a return to the
"proper" appraised market value; when the stigma has dissipated.
45. Levy, Casualty Loss, supra note 41.
46. Levy, Landslides, supra note 41.
[Vol. 25
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of landslides from other types of defects which threaten serious
structural damage. Stigma loss can arise whenever the market
perceives a threat of future damage. The uniqueness of condomin-
ium stigma is revealed by applying this analysis of the cause of
stigma in the condominium context.
In the case of a single-family detached home, stigma arises be-
cause of fear of future damage to the home itself. In the case of a
condominium unit, stigma arises not only because of fear of future
damage to the unit itself, but more importantly, fear of future
damage to the surrounding common areas. Damage to the com-
mon areas will affect the value of a condominium interest in two
ways: (1) a present direct loss in value of the fractional share in
the common areas, and (2) a continuing vicarious loss in value of
the unit's airspace due to stigma. Subsequent repair of the com-
mon area structure or soil will remove the present loss in value of
the fractional share, but the stigma loss in the unit airspace will
remain. Perhaps the idea that repair cannot entirely remove a
loss in value to an individual condominium is more easily under-
stood than residual loss in a detached home. The home itself can
be physically repaired, but the unit airspace can be affected only
by repair of the surrounding structure; i.e., the unit's value can
only be restored indirectly. With this background of appraisal
principles and stigma in hand, the process of evaluating stigma
can be discussed.
Two methods to quantify residual loss in market value or
stigma associated with property damaged by landslides have been
set forth."8 These are the "modified cost" and the "case history"
approaches.4 9 They are simply variations on the "cost" and "mar-
ket comparison" approaches for estimating market value in gen-
eral.5 0 The variations are necessary because in addition to estimat-
ing the "after" value of the property (the market value of the
property after repair), the appraiser must also estimate the
47. It is conceivable that the stigma loss is directly associated with a residual loss in
value of the fractional common area interests. In other words, the loss in value of the
condominium interest might be due to a fear that future damage to the common areas will
result in a direct loss in value of the fractional interest, rather than a derivative loss in
value of the unit airspace. However, because the airspace unit is more a "home" than is a
fractional interest in a common structure, it seems more appropriate to associate the stigma
with the airspace rather than with the common area. The unit is where a buyer looks for
"magic" and where value is determined by subjective considerations, whereas the common
structure's value is more likely determined by objective considerations. The buyer is likely
to view his interest in the common areas as a commercial property interest, reserving his
sentiment for his individual unit. Commercial and other nonresidential property is not
prone to stigma (however it is often subject to another intangible loss-loss of goodwill).
48. Levy, Landslides, supra note 41, at 8.
49. Id. at 9.
50. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
1989]
9
Meyer: Book Review:  Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
"before" value of the property (the value of the property before
the damage occurred).51 If the property has not yet been repaired,
the "after" value must be estimated from an appraisal of the
property in its present (damaged) condition and the cost and na-
ture of recommended repairs. 2 The residual loss in value is the
difference between the "before" value of the property and the "af-
ter" value. 3
Evaluation of stigma loss in condominiums proceeds in a similar
manner. The condominium unit is valued considering the repaired
condition, the undamaged condition and the stigma loss of the
common areas. Because the market comparison technique is the
most appropriate method to appraise condominiums,54 stigma can
be evaluated among units in a building by comparing the units'
physical proximity to the damaged common area.5 The total loss
claimed by a homeowners association suing on behalf of all indi-
vidual owners, or as the real party in interest, is the sum of all
individual stigma losses."'
The use of a real estate appraiser is vital to the recovery of
stigma damages. It is his testimony and appraisal that will estab-
lish the proof needed at trial. Certified appraisals5 7 are the most
desirable. It is the appraiser's experience and professional judg-
ment that determine what defects cause stigma. To properly quan-
tify the stigma caused by the discovery and repair of construction
defects, an appraiser must become familiar with the design and
construction of the common areas, defects in the property, repair
efforts that were undertaken, and the value of similar but unaf-
fected condominiums. It is therefore important that an appraiser
be consulted in the early stages of the lawsuit. 8
51. Levy, Landslides, supra note 41, at 9.
52. Id.
53. Id. Both the "before" and "after" values are measured in present dollars. Stigma
is measured by the difference in value of the property in two different states (damaged and
not), not based on the time it is measured.
54. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. As a general guideline, stigma loss equal to 10-15% of the unit's market value
will result from serious common area defects. The loss will be the most in those units
directly adjacent to or above the common area defect and may drop off to nothing in
remote units. Conversations with real estate appraisers Gerald Kibbey, MAI and Harold
Godwin, MAI, San Diego.
56. After recovery of a damage award, the money must be distributed to the individ-
ual owners according to the stigma loss suffered by each. See Natelson, supra note 9 for a
discussion of allocation and distribution formulas, taking into account many complications
including the problem of successive owners.
57. Pursuant to the Lancaster-Montoya Appraisal Act, effective January 1988. CAL
CIV. CODE § 1922-1922.14 (West Supp. 1988).
58. Several articles have been written regarding the use of expert real estate apprais-
ers in court, including: Hay, When an Appraiser Takes the Stand, THE REAL ESTATE
APPRAIsER AND ANALYST, Fall 1985, at 27; Mainous, Court Testimony: An Appraisal of
[Vol. 25
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In California, establishing stigma loss is only the first step to
actual recovery by a homeowners association. No California case
involving real property has allowed stigma as an item of damages,
therefore, condominium and other homeowners have an uphill le-
gal battle. Ammunition may be found in the rationale and deci-
sions of two cases outside of California.
II. RECOVERY PERMITTED IN OTHER STATES
In the Wyoming case of Anderson v. Bauer,59 eight homeowners
brought actions in negligence and breach of warranty against the
builder for damages arising from water seepage in their base-
ments.6  Soils tests revealed a water table problem as the cause of
the damage." The trial court found that after repair, each of the
eight homeowners incurred additional damage, described as the
diminished value of their property due to the area's reputation for
having a water problem.2
On appeal, the defendant builder contested the measure of
damages.63 Although the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized
that "so much is subjective and uncertain in determining fair mar-
ket values before and after the damage ..."64 it nevertheless held
that "the diminished value of the property, because of a public
awareness of a water problem, is also recoverable [in addition to
cost to repair]."5 The court reasoned that it was "sufficient that
they [damages] be determined with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty based upon the evidence adduced and the nature of the in-
jury." 6 Here the evidence of diminished market value consisted of
the testimony of plaintiff's expert; a real estate appraiser . 7
A similar decision was reached in Colorado. In McAlonan v.
U.S. Home Corp.,68 the plaintiff, soon after buying her condomin-
ium 0 from defendant builder, discovered construction defects, in-
Oral Presentation, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER AND ANALYST, Spring 1986, at 75; and,
Howe, Lawyers and Real Estate Appraisers: How They Can Prepare for Litigation, THE
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER AND ANALYST, Fall 1986, at 26.
59. 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984).
60. Id. at 1319.
61. Id. at 1320.
62. Id. at 1324.
63. Id. at 1319.
64. Id. at 1323-24.
65. Id. at 1324.
66. Id. at 1325.
67. Id.
68. 724 P.2d 78 (Colo. App. 1986).
69. Here the plaintiff buyer owned the cracked foundation. Thus, this is not a case
where the stigma derives from other property, as is the case in a typical condominium
where only the airspace is owned individually.
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cluding severe cracks in the foundation.7 0 The complaint alleged
negligence and breach of implied warranty.71 On appeal from a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant argued that the
trial court erred in instructing the jurors that if they found for the
plaintiff, to "award as her actual damages the reasonable cost of
repairing the property, together with the decrease in market value,
if any, to the property, as repaired." 72
The court first recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover damages as necessary to make her whole.73 The court then
noted that there was "a possibility that the property, as repaired,
may nevertheless have a reduced market value."'74 Thus, the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper
and affirmed the judgment.7 5 The court reasoned that the prop-
erty, from the time the damage was discovered in 1981 to the time
of judgment in 1986, failed to appreciate as it would have had it
been properly built.78 The court reasoned that "[a]ppreciation or
added value may properly be considered a loss. '" 77 The court per-
mitted the plaintiff to recover more than her purchase price (but
not more than the present market value of her home) in compen-
satory damages from the builder.7 8 The court summarily rejected
defendant's argument that the award constituted double
recovery.79
Both the Colorado and Wyoming courts determined that the
difference in the property's present value, as repaired, and its esti-
mated present value, had there been no defect, was compensable.80
While Colorado saw the cause of diminution in market value as a
"failure to appreciate"8' and Wyoming saw it as a "reputation for
problems, 82 both jurisdictions recognized what appraisers call
stigma. Both defects involved severe problems with fundamental
elements of the property-the soil and foundation. 3 In both cases
70. McAlonan, 724 P.2d at 79.
71. Id.
72. id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 79-80.
76. Id. at 80.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The feared double recovery was of both the cost to repair the foundation and
the loss in value of the property as damaged, as opposed to both the cost to repair the
foundation and the loss in value of the property as damaged and repaired (stigma).
80. See Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1324 (Wyo. 1984); McAlonan v. U.S.
Home Corp., 724 P.2d 78, 79-80 (Colo. App. 1986).
81. See McAlonan, 724 P.2d at So.
82. See Anderson, 681 P.2d at 1324.
83. See id. at 1320; McAlonan, 724 P.2d at 80.
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the jury, relying on expert testimony, was allowed to find that de-
spite repair, the property was not restored to its full market
value.84 The diminution in value was not because the repair efforts
were insufficient, but because of the market's perception of a
stigma on the property described as a "reputation" or a "failure to
appreciate" by the courts.
These are the only reported appellate cases allowing stigma
damages for construction defects and therefore provide guidance
for California courts. 5 However, neither opinion gives a thorough
analysis of how the decision fits in with the law of damages. Both
suits sounded in negligence and breach of warranty."6 However,
neither court made clear which legal theory was used to recover
for stigma. The Colorado Court of Appeals simply relied on the
maxim that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole,87 without
discussing the various rules of measuring damages which have
been developed for the two causes of action. Similarly, the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming discussed the appropriate measure of
damages in general terms. Nonetheless, the decisions do suggest
that stigma caused by construction defect damage to one's prop-
erty should be a ground for recovery in California. The step to
allow compensation for stigma to a condominium from damage to
common areas is a small and sensible one because of the growing
importance of the condominium as a form of home ownership, and
the close connection between damaged common areas and stigma-
tized units.
84. See Anderson, 681 P.2d at 1325; McAlonan, 724 P.2d at 80.
85. California trial courts have taken the initiative in allowing recovery for stigma
arising from construction defects. For example, in Mount La Jolla Ass'n v. Marview Inves-
tors, No. 474790 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1986), Superior Court Judge William Todd upheld
remaining "diminution in value" as a recoverable item of damages over and above cost to
repair. The case involved serious soil subsidence problems and subsequently settled out of
court for $17 million. San Diego Union, June 14, 1987, § F at 25, 28. Judge Todd is now
on the 4th District Court of Appeal and is in a position to set important precedent. See
also Pacifica Terrace Homeowners' Ass'n v. Pacifica Terrace, Ltd., No. C417-425 (Los
Angeles County 1988, Judge Edward M. Ross), and Bitzer v. G.W.C., Dev. Corp., No.
521192 (San Diego County 1988, Judge Arthur W. Jones).
Trial courts have also allowed stigma damages in several landslide cases. See, e.g., the
following trial court dispositions as reported in JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY: Oakes v. City of
Hayward, No. 582049 (Alameda County 1984); Press v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 112985
(Marin County 1986); Crowley v. Kramer, No. 80335 (Santa Cruz County 1986); Walsh/
George v. California, No. 199364 (San Bernardino County 1986); Rials v. California, No.
286173 (San Mateo County 1987); Oceanside Manor Homeowner's Ass'n. v. Summers,
Inc., No. N 13925 (San Diego County 1987); Rappaport v. City of Berkeley, No. 565428-0
(Alameda County 1987); Priestly v. Town of Hillsborough, No. 275613 (San Mateo
County 1987); Goodrich v. Pancallo, No. 90138 (Santa Cruz County 1987); and Chatman
v. City of Oakland, No. 575572-1 (Alameda County 1988).
86. See Anderson, 681 P.2d at 1319; McAlonan, 724 P.2d at 79.
87. See MeAlonan, 724 P.2d at 79.
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III. TORT THEORIES
The California rules of damages will now be examined to deter-
mine whether recovery of stigma is compatible with theories of
negligence, negligent interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage, and strict liability. "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in
the courts, it is 'indispensable that they be bound down by strict
rules and precedents ...."I'll Commentators on California law
have stated that "[iut ... seems logical that a claim for diminu-
tion in value of each individual unit could be included to the ex-
tent that a stigma remains with the unit notwithstanding the re-
pairs"8 and "[a]rguably,... the appropriate measure of damages
can include residual loss of market value above and beyond the
cost of repair." 90
A. Negligence
In the leading case of Sabella v. Wisler,91 the California Su-
preme Court held the doctrine of caveat emptor, or "let the buyer
beware," inapplicable to a contractor's negligent construction of a
residential unit.92 Thus, negligence law was applied to the con-
struction industry, which imposed upon a builder the duty of rea-
sonable care. Although the measure of damages is still unclear for
breach of this duty, a strong argument can be made for allowing
recovery of stigma damages in California within the guidelines set
by the court.
The general rule is that the measure of damages for negligent
injury to property is the difference in value of the property imme-
diately before and immediately after the injury, or the cost of re-
pair, whichever is less.9 3 This "lesser of" formula has long been
the rule. Contrary to the Colorado Court of Appeals holding in
McAlonan v. U.S. Home, 4 the California Court of Appeals has
held that a jury instruction which stated that the plaintiff was
"entitled to recover the reasonable cost of necessary repairs ...
and the difference between the market value of said property im-
mediately before the damage and after the damage, after making
any necessary repairs" was prejudicially erroneous as it permitted
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
89. T. MILLER, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION DEFECT AND LAND SUBSIDENCE LITIGA-
TION 45 (1986).
90. J. MCGUIRE, LANDSLIDE AND SUBSIDENCE LIABILITY 79 (Supp. 1986).
91. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
92. Id. at 25, 377 P.2d at 891, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
93. Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, 67 Cal. App. 3d 565, 576, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751, 757
(1977).
94. 724 P.2d 78 (Colo. App. 1986).
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double recovery.9 5 Three years later a California Court of Appeals
approvingly noted the holding, saying "it is clear ... that either
the diminution in value or cost of restoration, whichever is less, is
the proper measure of damages in a property damage case."9
The "lesser of" rule is not contrary to a rule that would allow
stigma damages. Stigma is the residual loss after repair, not the
total diminution in value. Cost of repair plus stigma is a closer
approximation of the total diminution in value or the actual loss
sustained. However, the jury instruction held to be erroneous
could have been read as authorizing cost of repair plus stigma.
Perhaps the court was concerned that the jury might be confused
by the instruction's language and find damages based on cost of
repair plus the difference between the market value before the
damage and after the damage, rather than "the difference be-
tween the market value of said property immediately before the
damage and after the damage, after making any necessary re-
pairs" as instructed.97 The court may not have held the instruc-
tion erroneous had it been as clear as the one given in Colorado. 9
Therefore the decision does not necessarily express the court's dis-
approval of stigma damages, but may only stress the need for jury
instructions to be clear. Allowing stigma damages plus cost of re-
pair does not violate the "lesser of" rule, and it is the "lesser of"
rule that is discussed by the court as being violated by the
instruction.99
In the case of condominiums, the "lesser of" rule does not cre-
ate a problem. Separate instructions to compensate for damaged
common areas and damaged individual units should be given. The
award for physically damaged common areas can be measured by
the cost of repair or the loss in value, whichever is less. The award
for damage to the individual units can only be measured by the
loss in value because the intangible unit airspace cannot be physi-
cally repaired. Because the awards for cost of repair and stigma
are to compensate for injury to two different properties, the possi-
95. Mozzetti, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 575-76, 136 Cal Rptr. at 756-57. The court did not
discuss the distinction between recovery of (1) cost to repair plus diminution in value
(double recovery) and (2) cost to repair plus residual diminution in value after repair
(stigma).
96. Ferraro v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d 33, 50, 162 Cal. Rptr. 238,
248 (1980) (emphasis in original).
97. Mozzetti, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 575-76, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57 (emphasis
added).
98. McAlonan, 724 P.2d 78. In McAlonan, the jury was instructed to award dam-
ages for "the reasonable cost of repairing the property, together with the decrease in mar-
ket value, if any, to the property, as repaired." Id. at 79. See supra notes 68-79 and accom-
panying text.
99. Mozzetti, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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bility of double compensation for the same injury, in violation of
the "lesser of" rule, does not arise.
Despite the apparent rigidity of the "lesser of" rule in Califor-
nia, the courts continue to emphasize that it is only a "general
rule"'' 0 and that "there is no fixed, inflexible rule for determining
the measure of damages for injury to, or destruction of, property,
and whatever formula is most appropriate in the particular case
will be adopted ... ."101 However, California seems to have cre-
ated a special rule for measuring damages when injury to property
is caused by construction defects.
In Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe DevelopmentCo.,'0 2 construction defects affected the landscaping and exterior
walls of the individual units of a condominium project. 03 The
court did not mention the well-accepted "lesser of' rule, but
merely concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost
of repair (plus compensation for loss of use).0 4 Commentators are
the only authority cited by the court for its rule that damages for
construction defects are measured by the cost of repair. 05 The
court's use of this authority has been criticized as a "misleading if
not a direct misquote."'' 06 Nonetheless, the facts of Raven's Cove
are distinguishable from those which give rise to stigma, as it did
not involve subsurface, structural, or other serious defects.
Raven's Cove is best understood as applying an appropriate mea-
sure of damages considering the facts of the case, and not as fash-
ioning a new rule for all construction defect cases. To regard the
decision as a new general rule would undermine the flexibility of
the court in fixing "the amount which will compensate for all the
detriment proximately caused"' 0 7 by a defendant's negligence.
Thus, allowing stigma damages for construction defects is not con-
trary to the general rule of real property damages, and is in keep-
100. Heninger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858, 863, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1980)
(citing Mozzetti).
101. Mozzetti, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
102. 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981).
103. Id. at 787, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
104. Id. at 802, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
105. Id. at 801-02, 171 Cal. Rptr at 345. The court cites H. MILLER & M. STARR,
CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE, § 9:20, 475 and Review of Selected 1976
California Legislation-Business Associations and Professions; Real Estate Develop-
ments-Real Party in Interest, 8 PAc. L.J. 211 (1977) for the idea that the proper measure
of damages is cost of repair. However, earlier the opinion quotes Witkin as saying that
"[a]nother permissible measure is the reasonable cost of repair .... 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 919, 3204. Therefore, the precise holding of
Raven's Cove is not that cost to repair is the measure of damages in all construction defect
cases but, that it is a proper measure of damages.
106. T. MILLER, supra note 89, at 235.
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West Supp. 1988).
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ing with a flexible approach.10 8 However, to date there is no direct
precedent for recovery of stigma damages to real property.
On the other hand, California courts have been confronted with
personal property cases where the court was persuaded to award
damages based on evidence of the repair costs and depreciation
remaining, despite repair. In Byrne v. Western Pipe & Steel
Co.,109 the plaintiff's truck was negligently damaged in a colli-
sion.11° Because the evidence showed that the truck was worth less
despite repair,1 1 the court found the measure of damages to be
"the difference between its value before the damage and its value
after the repairs have been made, plus the reasonable cost of mak-ing the repairs. '1 The same result was reached in another auto-
mobile case, Brown v. Roland."'3
In Merchant etc. Assn. v. Kellogg E. & D. Co.," 4 plaintiff's
woodworking machinery was damaged while being transported by
the defendant. 115 Despite repair, the machine "would nevertheless
remain a secondhand machine on the market,""i 6 and therefore
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the "cost of repairs and the
depreciation notwithstanding such repairs. 11 Authority for this
rule in the case of personal property damage is abundant outside
of California. 18
108. California BAJI jury instructions offer five alternative measures of damages for
injury to property, depending on the "evidentiary posture of the case." BAJI No. 14.20
(7th ed. 1986 and Supp. July 1987). These alternatives include a "cost to repair" rule, No.
14.20(C), a "lesser of" rule, No.14.20(C), and a "cost to repair plus remaining loss in
market value" rule if the property cannot be completely repaired, No. 14.20(C). Thus,
according to BAI the most appropriate measure of damages in a specific case depends
upon the evidence adduced at trial.
109. 81 Cal. App. 270, 253 P. 776 (1927).
110. Id. at 271, 253 P. at 777.
I11. Id. at 273, 253 P. at 777.
112. Id. at 274, 253 P. at 778.
113. 40 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 825, 104 P.2d 138 (1940).
114. 28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946).
115. Id. at 596, 170 P.2d at 924.
116. Id. at 601, 170 P.2d at 927.
117. Id. at 600, 170 P.2d at 926-27.
118. In the early Kansas case of Monroe v. Lattin, 25 Kan. 243 (1881), the plain-
tiff's horse, buggy, and harness were damaged due to the defendant's negligence. On appeal
a jury instruction that the plaintiff was entitled to recover "the difference in value of the
horse, buggy, and harness before the injury and after the repairs .... and, in addition, the
reasonable cost of repairs" was upheld. With the advent of the automobile came a long line
of cases allowing cost to repair plus remaining residual depreciation as the proper measure
of recovery for negligent injury to an automobile. These cases include:
Arizona: Farmer's Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. R. B. L. Inv. Co., 138 Ariz. 562, 675 P.2d 1381
(1983).
Connecticut: Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co. of New York, 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413
(1914) (concurring opinion).
Georgia: Olliff v. Howard, 33 Ga. App. 778, 127 S.E. 821 (1925).
Illinois: Koch v. Pearson, 219 Ill. App. 468 (1920).
Iowa: Halferty v. Hawkeye Dodge, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 750 (Iowa 1968).
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Other jurisdictions have not limited this measure of recovery to
compensation for injured automobiles. Cost to repair plus an
amount to compensate for remaining depreciation (stigma) has
been upheld as a proper measure of damages for injuries to a sur-
veyor's transit,119 canned goods,1 20 a bridge,1 21 transformers, 22 a
porcelain portrayal of the Last Supper, 2 s aluminum panels, 24
Kansas: Broadie v. Randall, 114 Kan. 92, 216 P. 1103 (1923); Venable v. Import Volk-
swagen, Inc., 214 Kan. 43, 519 P.2d 667 (1974).
Louisiana: Mask v. Monroe, 9 La. App. 431, 121 So. 250 (1928); U-Drive-It-Car Co. v.
Texas Pipe Line Co., 14 La. App. 524, 129 So. 565 (1930); Blevins v. Drake-Lindsay Co.,
144 So. 257 (La. App. 1932); Aschenbach v. Herrin Transfer & Warehouse Co., 153 So.
316 (La. App. 1934); Dupuy v. Graeme Spring & Brake Serv. Inc., 19 So.2d 657 (La.
App. 1944) (recognized).
Maryland: Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 12 Md. App. 62, 277 A.2d 464 (1971).
Missouri: Gilwee v. Pabst Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 487, 193 S.W. 886 (1917); Blanke
v. United Rys. Co., 213 S.W. 174 (Mo. App. 1919); Yawitz Dyeing & Cleaning Co. v.
Erlenbach, 221 S.W. 411 (Mo. App. 1920); Conley v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 259 S.W. 153
(Mo. App. 1921); General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 206 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 1947);
afid, 357 Mo. 1099, 21 S.W.2d 396 (1948).
Montana: Hoenstine v. Rose, 131 Mont. 557, 312 P.2d 514 (1957).
New Hampshire: Smith v. Turner, 92 N.H. 49, 24 A.2d 498 (1942); Copadis v. Haymond,
94 N.H. 103, 47 A.2d 120 (1946).
Pennsylvania: Bauer v. Armour & Co., 84 Pa. Super. 174 (1924); Finkerbinder v. Eberly,
30 Pa. D & C 312 (1937); Holt v. Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 54 A.2d 89 (1947); Herr v.
Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 62 A.2d 75 (1948).
South Carolina: Coleman v. Leukoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924); Newman v.
Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
Tennessee: Stoops v. First Am. Fire Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 239, 22 S.W.2d 1038 (1930).
Texas: Cooper v. Knight, 147 S.W. 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v.
McMeans, 188 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Main St. Garage v. Eganhouse Optical
Co., 223 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); W. F. Norman & Sons v. Clark, 221 S.W. 235
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Zumwalt, 239 S.W. 912 (Tex. Com.
App. 1922); Schmoker v. French, 7 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Northern Tex.
Traction Co. v. Singer, 34 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); McElwrath v. Dixon, 49
S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Chase Bag Co. v. Longoria, 45 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931); Tinney v. Williams, 144 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Higgins v. Stan-
dard Lloyds, 149 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Hodges v. Alford, 194 S.W.2d 293
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
Utah: Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 P. 676 (1920); Hill v. Varner, 4 Utah 2d 166,
290 P.2d 448 (1955).
Vermont: Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 49 A.2d 98 (1946).
Virginia: Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 237 S.E.2d 92 (1977).
Wyoming: Meredith GMC v. Garner, 78 Wyo. 396, 328 P.2d 371 (1958).
Federal: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp. 559 (W.D.Okla. 1946); The
Zeller No. 12, 68 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Canada: Chotem v. Porteous, 13 Sask. L.R. 209, 51 D.L.R. 507 (1920); Nesbitt v. Carney,
25 Sask. L.R. 129, 1 D.L.R. 106 (1930).
119. Thompson v. Field, 164 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
120. Larson Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kansas City, 115 Kan. 589, 224 P. 47
(1924).
121. Shell Oil Co. v. Jackson County, 193 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
122. Kirkhof Elec. Co. v. Wolverine Express, Inc., 269 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1959).
123. Olsen v. Ry. Express Agency, 295 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1961).
124. Conditioned Air Corp. v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 253 Iowa 961, 114
N.W.2d 304 (1962).
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and railroad cars.1 25 Notably, the court responsible for many of
the automobile cases, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 26 has
held this is a proper measure of damages for injury to a brick
building. 1  In a suit sounding in negligence, the plaintiff in Mc-
Daniel Bros. v. Wilson sought damages for the cost to repair the
building plus remaining depreciation. 128 The court said:
The difference between the value before injury and immediately
after the repairs were made did not fully indemnify appel-
lees. . . Had the repairs fully restored the building, their cost
would have been the measure of recovery; but since the repairs
did not fully restore the building, their cost, being reasonable
and necessary, was a proper item of recovery, in addition to the
depreciation in the value of the building. 28
Furthermore, the American Law Institute has adopted the "cost
to repair plus remaining depreciation" measure of recovery for
damage to personal property.130
The rationale of the various courts is instructive. In Metcalf v.
Mellen13 the Utah Supreme Court said "[it is obvious that re-
pairs may not restore a damaged car to the condition in which it
was before the damage was inflicted, and that after being repaired
the reasonable market value may still be less than before it was
damaged.' ' 2 This rationale is especially persuasive in cases where
the car is damaged when new. The "disfigurement of the car and
the restoration of the same necessarily diminished its value to or-
dinary purchasers desiring new cars . . . because "even if that
[restoration was] done, it would still be a repaired and renovated
car, which would make its market value much less than that of a
new car, which had never been injured, repaired, or repainted.' ' 34
Even though after repair the property is "equally as serviceable,
125. Soo Line Ry. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977).
126. See supra note 43.
127. McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
128. Id. at 622.
129. Id. at 622-23.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 928, provides: "Where one is entitled to a
judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in value, the damages
include compensation for (a) the difference between the value of the chattel before the
harm and the value after the harm or, at his election, the reasonable cost of repair or
restoration where feasible with due allowance for any difference between the original value
and the value after repairs . ... "
Section 928 is cited approvingly in the recent case of Carlson Indus. v. E.L. Murphy
Trucking Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696, 214 Cal. Rptr. 331, 333 (1985), involving injury
to a truck crane by a commercial carrier.
131. 57 Utah 44, 192 P. 676 (1920).
132. Id. at 48, 192 P. at 678. (emphasis added).
133. Broadie v. Randall, 114 Kan. 92, 93, 216 P. 1103, 1104 (1923).
134. Id. at 94, 216 P. at 1104.
1989]
19
Meyer: Book Review:  Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
or better,"'135 there still remains depreciation in its market value 36
because "[t]he fact that the equipment has been damaged has a
psychological effect upon the mind and judgment of a buying cus-
tomer .... ,1 These statements indicate judicial recognition of
the subjective, psychological cause of stigma.
Many reasons for allowing recovery in money damages for this
psychological effect have been expressed. The most basic is to
maintain a flexible approach: "The specific rule applied must de-
pend upon the facts in the case. ' 138 Another is fairness. Since a
recovering plaintiff's damages are often reduced if the market
value of the property is increased upon repair, similar allowance
should be afforded when repairs cannot restore the property to the
market value before the injury.' Also, because a plaintiff has a
duty to mitigate damages, a plaintiff undertaking reasonable re-
pairs in discharge of this duty should be entitled to recover the
costs of these reasonable repairs plus any remaining
depreciation. 4"
Thus, there is a basis on which California courts could conclude
that in a construction defect case, where the defect causes a
stigma which can be quantified by an expert appraiser, the loss in
value is recoverable, in addition to the cost of repairs. That repair
of severe construction defects may not restore a home to its pre-
injury market value is as logically clear as that a repair of an
automobile may not restore its market value.' 4' This is especially
true in the case of a condominium because of the way in which
the units derive much of their value from the surrounding com-
mon areas. Because a home is the single most expensive invest-
ment the average person will make, the psychological effect of dis-
closing prior damage/repair to a buying customer is certainly as
strong as in the case of an automobile. Home buyers especially
look for quality.'42 Therefore, any perceived flaws in the home will
have a large and foreseeable effect on market value.
If the rule that stigma is compensable in addition to cost of
135. General Const. Co. v. Kemplin, 309 Ky. 587, 588, 218 S.W. 384 (1949).
136. Id. at 589, 218 S.W. at 385.
137. Kirkhof Elec. Co. v. Wolverine Express, Inc., 269 F.2d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1959)
(Miller, J., dissenting).
138. Larson Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kan. City, 224 P. 47, 50 (1924).
139. Blanke v. United Rys. Co., 213 S.W. 174 (Mo. App. 1919); Chicago, R. I. &
G. Ry, Co. v. Zumwalt, 239 S.W. 912 (Tex. Com. App. 1922); Broadie v. Randall, 114
Kan. 92, 216 P. 1103 (1923); Larson Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kan. City, 115 Kan.
589, 224 P. 47 (1924); Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 206 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 1947).
140. Thompson v. Field, 164 S.W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Larson Bros. Whole-
sale Grocery Co. v. Kan. City, 115 Kan. 589, 224 P. 47 (1924); Coleman v. Levkoff, 128
S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924).
141. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. What Do Homebuyers Want?, REAL EST. TODAY, Mar. 1987, at 19.
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repair is adopted, it should be reconciled with the spirit of the
"lesser of" rule in putting a reasonable limit on damages. It is
again useful to look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
A variation on the "lesser of" rule expressly including an
amount for stigma has been expressed in Pennsylvania. In the case
of Ridington v. Lare1 43 the court said: "of the different measures
of damage, whether the cost to repair plus any [remaining] depre-
ciation, or the difference in value of the car before and after the
accident, the lesser measure of damage must be adopted. 1 4 The
plaintiff is entitled to recover either the total diminution in value
or the cost to repair plus any residual loss in value (stigma),
whichever is less. This rule seems to be a good solution because:
(1) it is in keeping with a long line of cases from many jurisdic-
tions involving negligent injury to a variety of property, both
real145 and personal;146 (2) the change would be in accord with
California's own flexible "general rule;"1 47 and (3) it would keep
in place a long-standing limit on recoverable damages.
As noted earlier, recovery for damaged condominiums does not
require the use of a "lesser of' rule, as the cost to repair goes
towards damage to the common areas and the loss in value goes
towards damage to the separate interests. It can be argued that
allowing this type of recovery will result in a flood of plaintiff
claims of a loss in value in their property due to damage to an-
other's property. Anyone living in a neighborhood with a defective
home may claim stigma loss. On the other hand, there are several
reasons to confine recovery of stigma loss derived from damage to
other property to condominiums. The condominium units suffering
the stigma are entirely surrounded and supported by the damaged
common area property which causes the stigma. Each unit owner
has a property interest in the surrounding common areas. Usually
each unit and its surrounding common areas are built by the same
contractor at the same time on similar soil. These considerations
make condominium stigma arising from common area defects
foreseeable, and provide a rationale for distinguishing such cases.
Certainly stigma in a detached home arising from a neighbor's
construction defects is not foreseeable.148
143. 58 Montg. Co. L. 334 (1942). In Ridington v. Lare the court said that of the
different measures of damage, whether the cost of repairs plus any depreciation, or the
difference in value of the car before and after the accident, the lesser measure of damage
must be adopted. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 59 & 68 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
148. Except perhaps in the case of a large development of single-family houses con-
structed by a common builder, in close proximity to each other, built upon common soil.
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The case for recovery of stigma as an additional item of dam-
ages for negligent injury to real property is strong, but there re-
mains another tactic in negligence. Stigma damage may give rise
to an additional cause of action for construction defects. Rather
than viewing the stigma as compensable because it is caused by
physical damage to property, stigma can be viewed as an eco-
nomic injury giving rise to a cause of action itself.
B. Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic
Advantage
It appears that in the case of damage to property, the concepts
of "residual depreciation" after repair and "loss of profit" from
resale of the tainted property refer to the same thing. Upon sale of
the property a loss in expected profit equal to the irreparable de-
preciation will be realized. Loss of expected profit is often termed
an "economic loss."' 149 While the rule that economic losses alone
are not recoverable in negligence'50 has not been expressly over-
ruled,' the rule is now otherwise. As Chief Justice Bird ex-
plained in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory:'
Where a special relationship exists between the parties, a plain-
tiff may recover for loss of expected economic advantage
through the negligent performance of a contract although the
parties were not in contractual privity....
[The] criteria are (1) the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm.
Recovery for injury to one's economic interests, where it is the
foreseeable result of another's want of ordinary care, should not
149. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); Pisano v.
Am. Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24
Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979); Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d
404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
150. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972).
151. In Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1984), the court imposed sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 against an attorney for citing
Seely without citing J'Aire or Pisano or Huang (see infra note 155 and accompanying
text). Although this decision was overruled in Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), these three later cases should not be ignored. Shep-
ard's Citations lists Seely as "criticized" in Huang.
152. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
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be foreclosed simply because it is the only injury that occurs. 1 3
These six criteria were held to have been satisfied in the con-
struction defect case of Huang v. Garner.1' In Huang, the de-
fendant construction company built the Caroline Apartments in
1965 on land owned by defendant Garner.15 Garner sold the
property to Bartels, who sold to the Piper Banning Group who, in
turn, sold to plaintiff Huang in 1974.156 Upon purchase of the
property, Huang discovered extensive structural damage in the ga-
rage area that led to the discovery of other purported design de-
fects in the property. 57 An issue on appeal was whether a partial
nonsuit as to the claim for economic loss in the plaintiff's negli-
gence cause of action against defendants Garner (the original
owner) and Encinal Park, Inc., (the general contractor) was
proper.'58
The court observed that "our Supreme Court in J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, [citation], has allowed recovery of economic loss ... by
permitting plaintiffs to recover economic losses in actions for neg-
ligent interference with prospective economic advantage where a
'special relationship' exists between the parties .... ,,15 The court
applied the six criteria'60 and noted that:
[I]t [is] reasonable to assume that as a developer of numerous
housing projects, Garner intended eventually to sell the apart-
ments and must have foreseen that the property would be pur-
chased by individuals or entities for investment purposes. It was
certainly foreseeable that defects in construction ... would dam-
age subsequent purchasers of the property as well as subsequent
residents. 6'
The court held that the nonsuit constituted reversible error.'
Because "[f]oreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration
in establishing the element of duty,"' 63 loss of economic advantage
should be recoverable by the purchasers of individual homes af-
fected by construction defects. It is certainly foreseeable that indi-
vidual buyers will suffer the same loss as that suffered in Huang.
Certainty that damage has occurred can be established by testi-
mony of an expert appraiser. The "closeness of the connection"
153. Id. at 804-05, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410. See also Pisano v. Am.
Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983).
154. 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
155. Id. at 411, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 419, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
159. Id. at 422, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. Huang, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
162. Id. at 425, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
163. J'Aire, 24 Cal. 3d at 806, 598 P.2d at 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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requirement between the builder's conduct and the injury is satis-
fied by a showing of direct cause.1'6 Violation of the Uniform
Building Code constitutes sufficient "moral blame" to meet the
fifth of the six criteria adopted in J'Aire.65 Finally, a policy to
prevent future harm "supports the eligibility to receive economic
damages ... because such a policy inheres in every building code
and would be advanced by penalizing a violation thereof."' 166
Thus, recovery of stigma under the theory of negligent interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage requires only an appli-
cation of the six J'Aire criteria and comparison of the facts in
Huang. No special distinctions are necessary for condominium
construction defects because the cause of action does not require
damage to plaintiff's property, it only requires a "close connec-
tion" between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's eco-
nomic injury. Indeed, this theory will be especially useful to con-
dominium owners because their cause of action may be
independent of any other action brought to recover for the dam-
aged common areas, and can therefore be brought after the main
action is resolved.
C. Strict Products Liability
In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 6 7 housing units were first classi-
fied as manufactured products, thus extending strict products lia-
bility to defectively constructed homes.""8 Since this time, jurisdic-
tions are split on the issue of whether damages for economic
loss' 69 should be recoverable in strict liability.170 However, the
majority of states, including California, disallow recovery. 17 The
rationales given are that an extension of strict liability would dis-
place the law of sales, which has been specifically designed to gov-
ern the economic relations between merchants and consumers; 72
164. Huang, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 424, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
168. Id. at 73, 207 A.2d at 325.
169. Economic loss is defined as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of
personal injury or damages to other property .... " Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v.
Grumman Flxible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 294, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1984) (quoting
Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 II. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100, 102
(1977)).
170. See Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic
Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966); Schneier, Recovery of
Economic Loss Damages in Strict Liability, COMTs. LIT. RPTR. 702, 703 (1986).
171. J. McGUIRE, supra note 90, at 174.
172. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443(1982).
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manufacturers should not be held to a specific level of business
performance without representing that the product meets the con-
sumer's business needs;173 economic losses are properly recover-
able in warranty, thus the availability of recovery in strict liability
is unnecessary; 174 consumers are capable of purchasing a war-
ranty, thereby internalizing the economic risks;176 and the legisla-
ture, not the courts, should decide whether economic losses are
recoverable under strict products liability, because such an exten-
sion would have radical economic consequences in the market
place.17 6
There are many reasons why recovery should be permitted: (1)
"the source of liability must be put 'where it ought to be;' ""' (2)
unsophisticated consumers may not be able to bargain for warran-
ties;178 (3) the extent of the victim's harm is not dependent upon
the existence of physical injury; 79 and (4) a defective product
may create a hazardous condition, yet not cause "physical harm"
damages which are recoverable in tort.'
Reconciling these two views with respect to all product liability
cases is a formidable task. "Limiting the strict liability/economic
loss issue to the construction industry, however, may make the
task of reconciliation significantly easier."' There are several ar-
guments in support of this proposition: (1) the parties to a con-
struction contract are sophisticated and can make informed cost-
benefit analyses; (2) the risks are well known (and therefore al-
lowance will not lead to "damages of unknown and unlimited
scope"); 8 2 (3) the business activities are covered by insurance or
bonding; (4) the consequences of misfeasance are foreseeable; and
(5) the parties know that others will rely upon their products. 8 3
As Justice Peters argued in his dissenting opinion in Seely v.
White Motor Co.:""
173. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 23 (1965).
174. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d
Cir. 1980).
175. Id.
176. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 439 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
177. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
178. Id.
179. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 24-25, 403 P.2d at 155-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28 (Peters,
J., concurring and dissenting).
180. Cloud v. Kit Mfg., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1977).
181. Schneier, supra note 170, at 706.
182. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 25, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28. (Peters, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
183. Schneier, supra note 170, at 706.
184. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965)(Peters, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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Suppose, for example, defective house paint is sold to two home
owners. One suffers temporary illness from noxious fumes, while
the other's house is destroyed by rot because the paint proved
ineffective .... Although the latter buyer may clearly suffer the
greater misfortune, the majority would not let him recover under
the strict liability doctrine because his loss is solely "economic,"
while letting the first buyer recover the minimal costs and lost
earnings caused by his illness. 85
Notwithstanding the above arguments, allowance of recovery for
economic damages, e.g. loss of expected profits or residual depre-
ciation in strict products liability, is a minority position.,,, But
perhaps an analogy to insurance coverage will provide an avenue
for recovery in strict liability.
In Geddes & Smith v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co.,'8 7 the
plaintiff sought to recover from defendant insurance company
under a policy providing coverage for "injury to or destruction of
property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident."'88
In discussing the types of damages recoverable under this lan-
guage, the court drew a distinction between two issues: (1) the
type of injury covered by the policy, and (2) the method by which
the damage to the property is to be measured. 8 ' The court held
that "economic" damages, such as the salaries of repair workers
and overhead, while not an insured type of injury, were "recover-
able because they provide a measure of the dollar amount of the
injury to the houses."' 90 Here the injury giving rise to "property
damage" was the installation of defective doors in plaintiff's in-
sured houses.'91
The California court again interpreted similar language in
Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London.'92 Here
the court held that the loss in market value to the plaintiff's home
due to a defectively installed heating system was a proper measure
of damages that is "separate and distinct from any claim based
upon the cost of repair or replacement of the defective heating
system itself," and hence was covered by the insurance.'93 In
Gogerty v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 9 the
court disapproved the lower court's holding that there was no
property damage, within the meaning of the policy, where defec-
185. Id. at 25, 403 P.2d at 155-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
186. Schneier, supra note 170, at 703.
187. 63 Cal. 2d 602, 407 P.2d 868, 47 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1965).
188. Id. at 604, 407 P.2d at 870, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
189. Id. at 607, 407 P.2d at 871-72, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68.
190. Id. at 609, 407 P.2d at 873, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 569 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 604, 407 P.2d at 869, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
192. 238 Cal. App. 2d 532, 47 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1965).
193. Id. at 538-39, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
194. 238 Cal. App. 2d 574, 48 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1965).
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tive components were incorporated in the structure because no
property, other than the components themselves, were damaged.
1 95
"The injury occurred when the [defective components] were made
a part of the building ... 9 despite the lack of visible, tangible
damage to other parts of the structure.
Analogously, while "stigma/taint" may not be a recoverable
type of injury in strict liability because it is "economic damage,"
it may be recoverable because it provides a measure of the dollar
amount of the intangible injury to the property. Here the injury
would be the defective 97 construction, measured by the cost to
repair plus remaining depreciation (rather than considering the
stigma a separate type of injury). Following the reasoning of Ged-
des, Eichler, and Gogerty, a tangible injury in components of the
building (the defective common areas being analogous to the de-
fective doors, heating system, and structural components) causes a
"physical" injury to the entire property, measured by loss in value
and/or cost to repair (otherwise considered "economic" damages).
In the condominium situation, stigma could be conceived of as a
measure of the intangible damage to the unit airspace, rather than
as an additional item of damages.
A third approach for the recovery of stigma by condominium
owners suggests itself from the language of the court in Sacra-
mento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible. 98 "The rule
imposing strict liability in tort presupposes (1) a defect and (2)
further damage to plaintiff's property caused by the defect. When
the defect and the damage are one and the same, the defect may
not be said to have caused physical injury [but only economic
damage]."199 The stigma on an individual unit might be consid-
ered the "further damage" caused by the defect in the common
areas. In this way, stigma on a condominium unit is not economic
damage at all but is further property damage apart from the de-
fects in the common areas.
Therefore, stigma might be recoverable using a number of strict
liability arguments, despite the exclusion of recovery for "eco-
nomic" items of damages.
195. Id. at 579, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
196. Id.
197. Just what constitutes a "defect" is not entirely clear. See T. MILLER, supra note
89, at § 5.2, and cases cited therein.
198. 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1984).
199. Id. at 294, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
This Comment has analyzed the concept of stigma as a recover-
able item of damages for construction defects in general, and
those involving condominiums in particular. In causes of action for
negligence, the "lesser of' rule initially seems to present difficulty.
However, the courts have often expressed a flexible approach in
awarding damages. Furthermore, an award of stigma damages
plus cost of repair is not strictly violative of the "lesser of' rule, as
stigma is the residual diminution in value after repair, not the to-
tal diminution in value. The rule should be modified to allow re-
covery of the cost of repair plus residual depreciation, or the total
depreciation, whichever is less. In the case of condominiums, the
"lesser of" rule is not a problem, as damages to the individual
units and common areas are distinct.
Under the negligent interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage cause of action, stigma damages can be found recoverable
by a straightforward application of the six required elements. Re-
covery in strict liability will require more complicated arguments.
Again, the fact that the common areas and individual units are
regarded as separate property interests provides an additional ar-
gument for recovering condominium stigma damages.
Because of the multiple theories alleged by construction defect
plaintiffs, it is likely that stigma will soon be recognized as recov-
erable in California. For the condominium owner such a holding
will be especially welcome. An award of stigma damages to the
individual owners will compensate them directly for their intangi-
ble loss, rather than the owners having to seek a share of any
award to the homeowners association for cost to repair.
With due consideration to the arguments set forth here, prece-
dents set by other states in construction defect cases, the rules of
damages for injury to personal property in California and else-
where, and recent trends in local trial courts, California courts
should be in a position to award stigma damages in condominium
construction defect litigation. The final difficulty is one of proof.
Appraisers may simply become another in a long list of experts
required to investigate and testify in these already complicated
cases.
Charles L. Stott*
* To my wife Rochelle, thank you for your love, support, and encouragement.
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